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Abstract 
We model unique state interventions to rescue commercial banks during the 2008-09 global 
financial crisis with the complementary binary logistic models that accommodate their skewed 
distribution. Our findings show that large and illiquid banks, and banks from countries with weak 
regulations, and weak shareholder and creditor rights are more likely to receive state intervention. 
These findings remain robust to a restricted definition of state intervention, alternative measures of 
bank fundamentals, placebo estimations, counterfactual sampling with propensity scores, and bank 
and country sample splits. These bank and incremental country level predictors can help regulators 
and supervisors limit future state interventions. 
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State interventions to rescue banks during the global financial crisis 
1. Introduction 
During the 2008-09 global financial crisis (henceforth, financial crisis), many banks received 
state interventions. At the time, monetary and financial authorities were particularly concerned 
about the disruptions in the functioning of markets and their consequences for economic growth, as 
observed during the great depression. Moreover, political authorities became extremely sensitive to 
the public outcry caused by the fact that the support given to banks was funded by taxpayers and 
not by debt and shareholders. This unique context can be used to identify the predictors of state 
interventions, thus furthering our understanding of the causes and consequences of the global 
financial crisis (Abreu and Gulamhussen, 2013b) and informing post-crisis debates and reforms 
(Clare et al., 2016). 
Studies on state interventions to rescue banks during the financial crisis focus most notably on 
the troubled asset relief program (TARP) in the United States (U.S.) (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 
2012; Blinder and Zandi, 2010; Ncube, 2016; Taylor, 2009). We add to these studies by focusing 
on Europe where country differences and the distinct bank fundamentals resulting from its bank-
dominated infrastructure provide a unique setting to understand the predictors of state interventions 
during the financial crisis.1 
We assemble a unique sample of 633 European commercial banks (henceforth, banks), 42 of 
which received state interventions during 2008 and 2009. In order to accommodate the skewed 
                                                 
1 Our research is also related to previous studies that identify early warning signals of failure/distress in different 
countries and regions (Kumar and Ravi, 2007). We make two contributions to this literature. First, we extend previous 
studies that identify early warning signals for economic, strategic, legal and regulatory failure/distress by focusing on 
state interventions. Second, we advance previous studies that look mainly into Asia (Bongini et al., 2001; Arena, 2008), 
Latin America (Arena, 2008), Norway (Clare and Priestley, 2002) and the U.S. (Martin, 1977; Whalen and Thomson, 
1988; Thomson, 1991; Hwang et al. 1997; DeYoung, 2003; Shaffer, 2012; DeYoung and Torna, 2013) by focusing on 
Europe (see also Poghoshyan and Cihak, 2011). 
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distribution of state interventions, we deploy the complementary binary logistic model known as 
the clog-log and the standard binary logistic model.2 Our findings show the bank and incremental 
country level predictors of state interventions. Large and illiquid banks, and banks from countries 
with low regulatory restrictions on bank activity, protection to shareholders and creditors, 
government spending, and independence of supervision are more likely to have received state 
interventions. These predictors remain robust to a number of tests that encompass state interventions 
restricted to recapitalizations; alternative measures of bank fundamentals, placebo year estimations, 
and counterfactual sampling with propensity matching scores. These findings can help regulators 
and supervisors to detect banks that may require state interventions. 
We describe our data, variables, statistics and the method in Section 2, report the findings in 
Section 3, and conclude with an assessment of policy implications in Section 4. 
2. Data, variables, descriptive statistics and method 
2.1. Sample 
We collected data on state interventions to rescue banks from the European Commission (E.C.).3 
Our data include information on bank fundamentals from Bankscope (Bureau Van Dijk); and 
country characteristics from several sources: on regulation and supervision from Barth et al (2013), 
                                                 
2 The related literature on failures/distress use mainly binary classification models to predict failure/distress (Asia: 
Bongini et al., 2001; Arena, 2008; Latin America: Arena, 2008; Norway: Clare and Priestley, 2002; United States 
(U.S.): Martin, 1977; Whalen and Thomson, 1988; Thomson, 1991; Hwang et al. 1997; Shaffer, 2012; DeYoung and 
Torna, 2013); and proportional hazards models to predict the time to failure/distress (Asia and Latin America: Arena, 
2008; U.S.: DeYoung, 2003). Lee and Urrutia (1996) show that binary classification and proportional hazard models 
lead to similar findings and interpretations. Few studies use other methods, namely multivariate discriminant analysis 
(Turkey: Canbas et al. 2005), data envelopment analysis (U.S.: Barr et al., 1994), neural networks (U.S.: Alam et al., 
2000; Bell, 1997; Tam and Kiang, 1992), and multiple-criteria decision making (Spain: Olmeda and Fernandez, 1997) 
to classify failed/distressed and nonfailed/nondistressed banks. We also contribute to the literature by deploying this 
model clog-log.   
3 The Directorate General of Competition (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm) discloses the 
decisions and press releases for each state intervention. 
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on shareholder rights from Djankov et al. (2007), on creditor rights from Shleifer et al. (2008) and 
on government spending from Eurostat4.  
We compiled data on state interventions during the 2008-09 financial crisis. We collected data 
on bank fundamentals from Bankscope by selecting “commercial banks” to ensure a homogeneous 
sample of European banks. A careful qualitative evaluation of the data and the exclusion of banks 
with missing data resulted in the compilation of our sample of 633 commercial banks; 42 of these 
banks in 13 European countries received state interventions. We summarize this compilation at the 
country level in Table 1 and at the bank level in Table 2. 
2.2 Variables 
State interventions 
The dependent variable in our analysis is labeled STATE INTERVENTION. This is a binary 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank received state intervention during the financial crisis 
2008-09 and 0 otherwise. 
Bank fundamentals 
Our data on bank fundamentals include solvability, asset quality, earnings, liquidity, and size 
variables from Bankscope (see also Arena, 2008; Shaffer, 2012; Poghoshyan and Cihak, 2011; 
Ncube, 2016)5. We use EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS, i.e. the extent to which assets are financed 
by equity, as a measure of solvability. The equity provided to banks by shareholders indicates the 
strength of the balance sheet. Higher values of equity indicate greater capacity to withstand losses 
and are therefore negatively related with state interventions. We use LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS 
                                                 
4 Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-tec00023/) discloses macroeconomic information on 
member countries. 
5 These studies use different combinations and measures of these indicators to predict economic, strategic and legal 
failures (Arena, 2008); regulatory failures (Shaffer, 2012); distress (Poghoshyan and Cihak, 2011); and TARP 
interventions (Ncube, 2016). 
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to net interest income, i.e. the extent to which banks created reserves to withstand losses arising 
from problematic loans, as a measure of the quality of assets. Provisions for loan losses indicate the 
cushion that banks possess to withstand loan impairment. Higher values of this ratio indicate greater 
effort to withstand losses and are therefore positively related with state interventions. We use the 
RETURN ON ASSETS as a measure of earnings. Higher values of this ratio indicate the resilience 
of banks to absorb losses and are therefore negatively related with state interventions. We use the 
INTERBANK RATIO, i.e. the ratio of the amount of loans provided to the interbank market to the 
loans received from the interbank market as a measure of liquidity possessed by banks to withstand 
unexpected withdrawals of deposits during crisis situations. Higher values of this ratio indicate the 
liquidity possessed by banks and are therefore negatively related with state interventions. 6 
We assess the robustness of the findings based on the above fundamentals by using the TOTAL 
CAPITAL RATIO, i.e. the ratio of total regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, as an alternative 
to EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS; IMPAIRED TO TOTAL LOANS, i.e. the ratio of impaired 
loans to total loans, as an alternative to LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS; RETURN ON EQUITY, i.e. 
the ratio of earnings to book value of equity, as an alternative to RETURN ON ASSETS; and 
LIQUID ASSETS TO DEPOSITS AND SHORT-TERM FUNDING, i.e. the ratio of the value of 
liquid assets (easily convertible to cash) to short-term funding (including deposits), as an alternative 
to the INTERBANK RATIO. 
While large banks have more resources to withstand losses, they also take more risks with the 
aim of becoming large in the assurance that states will support them in crisis situations (Abreu and 
                                                 
6 Shaffer (2012) uses the ratio of jumbo certificates to assets as a measure of liquidity, whereas Ötker-Robe and Podpiera 
(2010) use the ratio of loans to deposits, wholesale funding to total liabilities, short-term borrowing to total liabilities 
and liquid assets to total assets as alternative measures of liquidity. We use the interbank ratio and the liquid assets to 
deposits and short-term funding.  
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Gulamhussen, 2013a; Jiaqing et al., 2017). Bank SIZE defined as the logarithm of total assets is 
therefore positively related with state interventions. 
Country characteristics 
Our data on country characteristics address regulatory restrictions, capital stringency, and 
supervisory independence from Barth et al. (2013); shareholder rights from Djankov et al. (2007) 
and creditor rights from Shleifer et al. (2008); and government spending from EUROSTAT. 
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS measure the overall limits on activities conducted by banks 
based on the extent to which they can engage in underwriting, brokering and dealing in securities 
and mutual funds; insurance underwriting and distribution; and in real estate investment, 
development and management. Higher values of this variable indicate a financial sector with more 
restrictions on banking activities and are therefore negatively related with state interventions.7 The 
CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX measures the strictness of the measurement of capital based 
on appropriate consideration of risk and potential losses from financial transactions, and the 
availability of recapitalization buffers. Higher values of this variable indicate greater strictness in 
the determination of minimum capital that banks are required to hold and are therefore negatively 
related with state interventions. INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISON measures the independence 
of supervision based on the degree to which it is immune to political influence and is protected by 
the legal system. Higher values of this variable indicate greater independence of national 
supervisory entities in identifying weak banks and imposing remedial measures, and are therefore 
positively related with state interventions. 
                                                 
7 DeYoung and Torna (2013) show that bank failures in the U.S. declined due to fee-based activities (securities 
brokerage and insurance sales) and increased due to asset-based activities (venture capital, investment banking and 
asset securitization). 
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SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS measure the protection provided to shareholders based on the ease 
of voting by mail, the need to prove the right to vote, the existence of cumulative voting rules, the 
protection of oppressed minorities, the pre-emptive rights to buy new issues of stock and the level 
of equity required to call a shareholders’ meeting. CREDITOR RIGHTS measure the protection 
provided to creditors based on the ease with which debtors can file for reorganization, creditors are 
able to seize assets, secured creditors are paid first from the proceeds of liquidation, and 
management can retain administration pending the resolution of the reorganization. Increases in 
these variables raise the potential for outside monitoring and enforcement and are therefore 
negatively related with state interventions. GOVERNMENT SPENDING is the ratio of spending 
by the state to its gross domestic product. Low values of this ratio indicate room to accommodate 
spending in crisis situations and are therefore negatively related to state interventions.  
2.3 Descriptive statistics 
We describe our data in Tables 1-4. Table 1 sets out our data on the number of banks and state 
interventions by country. It identifies the 13 countries from which the banks under scrutiny originate 
and the 42 state interventions which represent 7% of the total number of banks in our sample. Table 
2 lists the banks that received state interventions, i.e. the 7% of banks identified in Table 1. It 
identifies the banks, the country of origin, the year in which they received state interventions, and 
the type of state intervention. 
In Table 3, we set out the variables and their descriptive statistics (average, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum) and the nonparametric test (t-test and significance) for the differences 
between banks that received state interventions and banks that did not. Our dependent variable 
STATE INTERVENTION shows a mean of 7% identical to the figure reported in Table 1. For our 
independent variables, we focus on statistically significant differences between banks that received 
state interventions and banks that did not. In terms of fundamentals, we find statistically meaningful 
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differences in the EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS, in the INTERBANK RATIO and in BANK 
SIZE. Banks that received state interventions had lower equity, were more reliant on the interbank 
market for funding, and were larger in size compared to banks that did not receive state 
interventions. In terms of country characteristics, we find a statistically meaningful difference in 
the CREDITOR RIGHTS. Banks headquartered in countries with lower creditor rights were more 
likely to receive state interventions. In Table 4, we present the pairwise correlations of the variables. 
As can be observed, the significant correlations are not large enough to cause concerns with respect 
to their linear dependence. 
2.4 Method 
We model state interventions as a function of bank fundamentals and country characteristics. 
We estimate this relation with the clog-log using robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level and assess the presence of heteroscedasticity with the Lagrange Multiplier test (Lee and 
Urrutia. 1996; Greene, 2017). In the estimation of the baseline model, we consider state 
interventions at the peak of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and bank fundamentals and country 
characteristics in 2007. In robustness tests, we consider 2006 as the placebo year, in other words, 
we assume that state interventions were dictated by bank fundamentals and country characteristics 
in 2006. The lagged variables avoid the reverse bias in the estimation of the model. Other robustness 
tests include restricted definition of state interventions, alternative definitions of bank fundamentals, 
counterfactual sample matching with propensity scores, bank and country sample splits, and the 
standard binary logistic model. We detail these robustness tests in the next section. 
3. Findings 
Tables 5-12 report our findings, more specifically, the maximum likelihood coefficients, robust 
standard errors in parenthesis, odds ratios and the statistical significance for all bank fundamentals 
and country characteristics. These Tables also report the log-likelihood for each model, the 
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likelihood ratio test that compares the model estimated with bank fundamentals and country 
characteristics with the model estimated with only bank fundamentals, the chi-square test of Wald, 
and the number of observations.  
3.1 Baseline 
We report the findings for the baseline in Tables 5.1(Panels A-E) - 5.2 (Panels F-J). We first 
estimate the model with only bank fundamentals and report the findings in Panel A. We then 
estimate the model in Panel A adding country characteristics one by one and report these in Panels 
B to H to assess their incremental predictive ability vis-à-vis the model estimated in Panel A. 
We discuss the findings of the full model reported in Table J. For bank fundamentals, 
INTERBANK RATIO is negatively and significantly related with state intervention at the 5% level 
of confidence; and SIZE is positively and significantly related with state intervention at the 1% 
level of confidence. For country characteristics, REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS, and 
SHAREHOLDER and CREDITOR RIGHTS are negatively and significantly related with state 
interventions all at the 1% level of confidence. The log-likelihood ratios test rejects the null that the 
distributions of models estimated in Panels A and J are similar at the 1% level of confidence, 
indicating the incremental predictive ability of the model with bank fundamentals and country 
characteristics vis-à-vis the model with only bank fundamentals. 
The bank-level findings indicate that large and illiquid banks are more likely to have received 
state intervention. The finding on liquidity is in line with the belief that the breakdown of trust in 
the functioning of interbank markets inhibited banks from tapping into immediate funding in these 
markets. The finding on size is in line with the too big to fail supposition in which large banks 
anticipated state support as the economic and political consequences of their collapse would 
ultimately be greater. These findings substantiate the heightened liquidity requirements imposed by 
regulators in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The incremental country-level findings 
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indicate that banks from countries that allow engagement in multiple activities, or provide weak 
protection to shareholders and creditors, are more likely to have received state intervention. 
Country-level structural reforms in these areas are likely to reduce future state interventions in 
banks. 
3.2 Restricted definition of state interventions 
The state interventions we study in this paper involved recapitalization and provision of 
guarantees. To assess the sensitivity of our findings to the type of state intervention, we re-estimated 
our model limiting state interventions to recapitalizations. We report the findings in Table 6. We 
first estimate the model with only bank fundamentals and report the findings in Panel A. We then 
estimate the model in Panel A adding groups of country characteristics in Panels B and C, and the 
full set of country characteristics in Panel D to assess their incremental predictive ability vis-à-vis 
the model estimated in Panel A. As can be observed in Panel D, EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS 
and SIZE are positively and significantly related to state intervention at the 1% level of significance. 
The log-likelihood ratio test rejects the null that the distributions of models estimated in Panels A 
and D, are similar at the 1% level of confidence, indicating the incremental predictive ability of the 
model with bank fundamentals and country characteristics vis-à-vis the model with only bank 
fundamentals. 
The bank-level findings indicate that large and better equity cushioned banks are more likely to 
have received state intervention. The finding on size is in line with the baseline. The finding on 
equity indicates that states preferred to recapitalize banks whose shareholders had plowed in 
sufficient equity. The country-level predictors are not significant at the conventional levels but add 
information to the model based on only bank fundamentals. 
3.3 Alternative measures for bank fundamentals  
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To assess the sensitivity of our findings to the measures of bank fundamentals, we re-estimated 
our model substituting EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS with the TOTAL CAPITAL RATIO, LOAN 
LOSS PROVISIONS to total assets with IMPARED TO TOTAL LOANS, RETURN ON ASSETS 
with RETURN ON EQUITY, and the INTERBANK RATIO with the ratio of LIQUID ASSETS 
TO DEPOSITS AND SHORT-TERM FUNDING. We report the findings with these alternative 
measures of bank fundamentals in Table 7. This Table reports the estimations of the full model with 
bank fundamentals and country characteristics, substituting the measures of bank fundamentals 
used in the baseline estimation in Tables 5.1-5.2 with the alternative measures. Panel A reports the 
findings for the TOTAL CAPITAL RATIO, Panel B for IMPAIRED TO TOTAL LOANS, Panel 
C for the RETURN ON EQUITY, Panel D for the ratio of LIQUID ASSETS TO DEPOSITS AND 
SHORT-TERM FUNDING, and Panel E for all the alternative measures together. For bank 
fundamentals, INTERBANK RATIO in Panels B and C, LIQUID ASSETS TO DEPOSITS AND 
SHORT-TERM FUNDING in Panel D and IMPAIRED TO TOTAL LOANS in Panel E are 
negatively related with state intervention at the 5% and 1% levels of confidence. In Panels A-E, 
SIZE is positively and significantly related with state intervention at the 1% level of confidence. 
For country characteristics, REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS and SHAREHOLDER and 
CREDITOR RIGHTS are significantly related with state intervention. These findings are in line 
with the baseline estimations reported in Tables 5.1-5.2. The log-likelihood ratio test rejects the null 
that the distributions of models estimated in Panels A and D are similar at the 1% level of 
confidence, indicating the incremental predictive ability of the model with bank fundamentals and 
country characteristics vis-à-vis the model with only bank fundamentals. 
The bank-level findings indicate that large and, in general, illiquid banks are more likely to have 
received state intervention. The relation between impaired to total loans is unexpected. An 
explanation could be that state intervention was directed towards large and illiquid banks but with 
 12 
 
better quality assets. The incremental country-level findings indicate that banks from countries that 
allow engagement in multiple activities, or provide weak protection to shareholders and creditors 
are more likely to have received state intervention. These findings are in line with the findings in 
the baseline. 
3.4 Placebo estimations 
To assess the sensitivity of our findings to the year in which we measure bank fundamentals, 
we re-estimated the baseline with bank fundamentals and country characteristics considering the 
end of 2006 as the placebo year. We report the findings with these alternative lagged variables in 
Table 8. In this Table, we report the estimations of the model with bank fundamentals in Panel A, 
adding groups of country characteristics in Panels B and C, and the full set of country characteristics 
in Panel D. In Panel D, for bank fundamentals, the findings indicate a negative and significant 
relation between the INTERBANK RATIO and state intervention at the 1% level of confidence; 
and positive and significant relations between SIZE and RETURN ON ASSETS and state 
intervention at the 1% and 5% levels of confidence; for country characteristics, the findings indicate 
negative and significant relations between REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS, at the 5% level of 
confidence, and SHAREHOLDER and CREDITOR RIGHTS and state interventions both at the 1% 
level of confidence, and positive and significant relations between INDEPENDENCE OF 
SUPERVISION and state interventions at the 10% level of significance. The log-likelihood ratio 
test rejects the null that the distributions of models estimated in Panels A and D are similar at the 
1% level of confidence, indicating the incremental predictive ability of the model with bank 
fundamentals and country characteristics vis-à-vis the model with only bank fundamentals. 
The bank-level and incremental country-level findings are in line with the baseline. In addition, 
they indicate that profitable banks, and banks from countries with independence of supervision are 
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more likely to have received state intervention. The finding on profitability points towards 
preference for state intervention in banks that were already economically viable. 
3.5 Counterfactual analysis 
To assess the average influence of state interventions on banks that accepted support, we 
construct a counterfactual group of banks that did not accept support based on their observable 
differences to banks that received state interventions with propensity matching scores (see also 
Ncube, 2016). We report the finds of estimations after constructing the counterfactual group of 
banks in Table 9. Panel A of this Table presents the estimations of the model with bank 
fundamentals, and Panel D shows estimations with bank fundamentals and all country 
characteristics. In Panel D, for bank fundamentals, the findings indicate a negative and significant 
relation between the INTERBANK RATIO and state intervention at the 10% level of confidence; 
and positive and significant relations between SIZE and state intervention at the 1% level of 
confidence; for country characteristics, the findings indicate negative and significant relations 
between REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS and SHAREHOLDER and CREDITOR RIGHTS and 
state interventions all at the 1% level of confidence, and positive and significant relations between 
INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION and state interventions at the 10% level of significance. The 
log-likelihood ratio test rejects the null that the distributions of models estimated in Panels A and 
D are similar at the 1% level of confidence, indicating the incremental predictive ability of the 
model with bank fundamentals and country characteristics (Panel D) vis-à-vis the model with only 
bank fundamentals (Panel A). 
The bank-level and incremental country-level findings are in line with the baseline. In addition, 
the findings indicate that banks from countries with independence of supervision are more likely to 
have received state intervention. 
3.6 Sample splits 
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Our baseline model considers the role of both bank fundamentals and country characteristics to 
explain state interventions. To further assess the sensitivity of our findings, we split our sample by 
bank size and by country groups. In the case of bank fundamentals, we split our sample into small 
and large banks based on their median size. In the case of countries, we split our sample into 
countries more impacted by the financial crisis namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
or the “GIIPS” and the “non-GIIPS” based on the market convention. 
For the sample split by size, we report the findings in Table 10, Panel A for small banks and 
Panel B for large banks. In Panel A, for bank fundamentals, the findings indicate a positive and 
significant relation between EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS and state interventions at the 10% level 
of confidence; for country characteristics, the findings indicate a positive and significant relations 
between SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS and GOVERNMENT SPENDING and state interventions 
both at the 10% level of significance. In Panel B, for bank fundamentals, the findings indicate a 
negative and significant relation between the INTERBANK RATIO and state intervention at the 
10% level of confidence; and a positive and significant relation between SIZE and state intervention 
at the 1% level of confidence; for country characteristics, the findings indicate negative and 
significant relations between REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS, and SHAREHOLDER and 
CREDITOR RIGHTS, and state intervention at the 1% level of confidence and positive and 
significant relations between INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION and state interventions at the 
10% level of significance. The log-likelihood ratio test rejects the null that the distributions of 
models estimated in Panels A and B are similar at the 1% level of confidence, indicating that state 
intervention in small banks differed in terms of the equity provided by shareholders and the room 
in government spending.  
In Panel A, bank-level findings indicate that banks whose shareholders had plowed in sufficient 
equity are more likely to have received state intervention; the incremental country-level findings 
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are in line with the baseline with the exception of creditor rights that is not significantly related to 
state intervention at a meaningful level and government spending that indicates that banks from 
countries with higher levels of government spending are more likely to have received state 
intervention. In Panel B, the bank-level and incremental country-level findings are in line with the 
baseline. In addition, the findings indicate that banks from countries with independence of 
supervision are more likely to have received state intervention. The statistical difference between 
the two panels is justified by the role that size and its implicit too big to fail label played in dictating 
state interventions. 
For the sample split by GIIPS and non-GIIPS, we report the findings in Table 11, Panel A for 
non-GIIPS and Panel B for GIIPS. In Panel A, for bank fundamentals, the findings indicate a 
negative and significant relation between the INTERBANK RATIO and state intervention at the 
5% level of confidence; and positive and significant relations between EQUITY TO TOTAL 
ASSETS and SIZE and state intervention at the 1% level of confidence; for country characteristics, 
the findings indicate negative and significant relations between REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS 
and SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS and state intervention at the 10% and 5% levels of confidence, and 
positive and significant relations between INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION and 
GOVERNMENT SPENDING and state intervention both at the 10% level of significance. In Panel 
B, for bank fundamentals, the findings indicate positive and significant relations between LOAN 
LOSS PROVISIONS and SIZE and state intervention at the 5% and 1% level of confidence; for 
country characteristics, the findings indicate negative and significant relations between 
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS INDEX and SHAREHOLDER 
RIGHTS and state interventions all at the 1% level of confidence, and positive and significant 
relations between INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION and state interventions at the 1% level of 
significance.  
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In Panel A (non-GIIPS) the bank-level and incremental country-level findings are in line with 
the baseline. In addition, the findings indicate that banks whose shareholders plowed in more equity, 
and banks from countries with independence on supervision and higher levels of government 
spending are more likely to have received state intervention. In Panel B (GIIPS), bank size and 
incremental country-level findings are in general in line with the baseline. In addition, the findings 
indicate banks from countries that require lower levels of capitals and with independence of 
supervision are more likely to have received state intervention. The statistical differences in the 
panels are justified by the extent of the fragility of GIIPS that ultimately required bailout from 
global multilateral agencies. 
3.7 Standard logistic model 
So far, we deployed the clog-log to model state interventions as a function of bank fundamentals 
and country characteristics to accommodate the skewed distribution of interventions. In this 
subsection, to further assess the robustness of our findings we deploy the standard logistic model to 
estimate the baseline regressions of Tables 5.1-5.2. We report the findings in Table 12. In this Table, 
we first estimate the model with only bank fundamentals and report the findings in Panel A. We 
then estimate the model in Panel A adding groups of country characteristics in Panels B and C, and 
the full set of country characteristics in Panel D, to assess their incremental predictive ability vis-à-
vis the model estimated in Panel A. We discuss the findings of the full model reported in Panel D. 
For bank fundamentals, the findings indicate a negative and significant relation between the 
INTERBANK RATIO and state intervention at the 5% level of confidence; and a positive and 
significant relation between SIZE and state intervention at the 1% level of confidence. For country 
characteristics, the findings indicate negative and significant relations between REGULATORY 
RESTRICTIONS, and SHAREHOLDER and CREDITOR RIGHTS and state intervention at the 
1% level of confidence. The log-likelihood ratio test rejects the null that the distributions of models 
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estimated in Panels A and D are similar at the 1% level of confidence, indicating the incremental 
predictive ability of the model with bank fundamentals and country characteristics vis-à-vis the 
model with only bank fundamentals. These findings are fully in line with those estimated with the 
more appropriate clog-log model. 
4. Summary and conclusion 
The 2008-09 global financial crisis led to many state interventions to rescue banks so that they 
could continue performing their activities. There continues to be much debate about these 
interventions among academics, policy makers and the media, most notably in the context of the 
TARP in the U.S. We add to this literature by examining Europe where differences in bank 
fundamentals and country characteristics provide a unique setting to understand the predictors of 
state interventions during the financial crisis. 
We estimate our model of state interventions with the complementary binary logistic model 
(clog-log) that accommodates the skewed distribution of interventions. Our estimations revealed 
that large and illiquid banks are more likely to have received interventions. Furthermore, country 
level features contribute to the prediction of interventions over and above bank fundamentals. Banks 
from countries with low regulatory restrictions on activities, independence of supervision from the 
government and the industry, weak protection provided to shareholders and creditors, and low 
government spending are more likely to have received intervention. These findings remain robust 
to a number of tests that encompass a definition of state interventions restricted to recapitalizations; 
alternative measures of bank fundamentals; placebo estimations; counterfactual sampling with 
propensity matching scores; and bank and country sample splits. 
The bank and incremental country level predictors can be used by regulators and supervisors as 
early warning signals of state intervention. These predictors also contribute to our understanding of 
the causes of the financial crisis, and inform the debates on post-crisis reforms. The state 
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interventions in illiquid and large banks are consistent with the widely accepted belief that these 
were dictated by the breakdown of the interbank markets, and by the too big to fail label. The state 
interventions in banks from countries with frail restrictions on their activities are consistent with 
the common belief that regulatory pressures on these entities are ineffective. These findings support 
the alterations in the regulatory and supervisory landscapes in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
that aim to limit the activities and consequently the size of banks directly or indirectly via the 
imposition of heightened capital and liquidity requirements. The weaknesses in shareholder and 
creditor rights are probably the least addressed reforms in the aftermath of the crisis. Reforms in 
these areas are likely to alleviate future state interventions and the subsequent costs for taxpayers 
via the development of capital markets where shareholder and creditors themselves will have to 
maintain sharp oversight of equity and debt provided to banks to avoid losses and haircuts in case 
of future stressful situations. 
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Table 1. State interventions by country during the 2008-9 global financial crisis 
 
  
Country Sample
State          
Intervention
%
Austria 42 2 5%
Belgium 18 3 17%
Czech Republic 9 0 0%
Denmark 44 1 2%
Finland 4 0 0%
France 89 8 9%
Germany 104 2 2%
Greece 14 6 43%
Hungary 14 1 7%
Ireland 10 3 30%
Italy 74 2 3%
Luxembourg 48 1 2%
Netherlands 16 5 31%
Poland 27 0 0%
Portugal 18 3 17%
Slovakia 11 0 0%
Spain 25 0 0%
Sweden 9 0 0%
United Kingdom 57 5 9%
Total 633 42 7%
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Table 2. State interventions by bank, year and type during the 2008-09 global financial crisis 
 
  
Bank Country Year Form
Raiffeisen Bank International AG Austria 2009 Guarantees, Recapitalization
Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank AG Austria 2008 Guarantees, Recapitalization, Nationalization
Fortis Bank SA Belgium 2008 Guarantees, Recapitalization, Nationalization
KBC Bank NV Belgium 2008 Guarantees, Recapitalization
Dexia Banque Belgique Belgium 2008 Guarantees, Recapitalization, Nationalization
Eik Bank Danmark A/S Denmark 2009 Recapitalization
BNP Paribas France 2008 Recapitalization
Société Générale France 2008 Recapitalization
Caisses d'Epargne Participations France 2008 Recapitalization
Natixis France 2008 Recapitalization
Groupe Crédit Mutuel France 2008 Recapitalization
Dexia Crédit Local SA France 2008 Guarantees, Recapitalization
CIF Group France 2008 Guarantees
RCI Banque France 2008 Guarantees
Commerzbank AG Germany 2008 Guarantees, Recapitalization
Aareal Bank AG Germany 2009 Guarantees, Recapitalization
National Bank of Greece SA Greece 2009 Recapitalization
Eurobank SA Greece 2009 Guarantees, Recapitalization
Alpha Bank AE Greece 2009 Guarantees, Recapitalization
Piraeus Bank SA Greece 2009 Guarantees, Recapitalization
Agricultural Bank of Greece Greece 2009 Guarantees, Recapitalization
Proton Bank SA Greece 2009 Guarantees, Recapitalization
OTP Bank Plc Hungary 2009 State liquidity scheme
Bank of Ireland Ireland 2008 Guarantees, Recapitalization
Allied Irish Banks Plc Ireland 2008 Guarantees, Recapitalization, Nationalization
Irish Life & Permanent Plc Ireland 2008 Guarantees, Recapitalization
Intesa Sanpaolo Italy 2009 Recapitalization
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Italy 2009 Recapitalization
Dexia Banque Internationale Luxembourg Luxembourg 2008 Guarantees, Recapitalization
ING Bank NV Netherlands 2008 Recapitalization
Fortis Bank NV Netherlands 2008 Recapitalization
SNS Bank NV Netherlands 2008 Recapitalization
NIBC Bank NV Netherlands 2008 Guarantees
LeasePlan Corporation NV Netherlands 2008 Guarantees
Banco Comercial Português SA Portugal 2008 Guarantees, Recapitalization
Banco Espírito Santo SA Portugal 2008 Guarantees
Banco Português de Negócios SA Portugal 2008 Guarantees, Recapitalization, Nationalization
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc United Kingdom 2008 Recapitalization
Lloyds TSB Bank Plc United Kingdom 2008 Recapitalization
Bradford & Bingley Plc United Kingdom 2008 Nationalized and liquidated
Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander Ltd United Kingdom 2008 In Administration
London Scottish Bank Plc United Kingdom 2008 In Administration
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of main variables 
STATE INTERVENTIONS is a binary variable where 1 indicates that the bank received state intervention during the 2008-09 financial crisis and 0 
otherwise. EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS is the ratio of equity to total assets; LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS is the ratio of loan loss provisions to net 
interest revenue; RETURN ON ASSETS is the ratio of earnings to average assets; INTERBANK RATIO is the ratio of loans extended to the interbank 
market to loans received from the interbank market; and BANK SIZE is the logarithm of the total assets of the banks. REGULATORY 
RESTRICTIONS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX and INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION are composite indexes that measure the overall 
restrictions on banking activities, the stringency of capital requirements and the degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from the 
government and legally protected from the banking industry. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of rights provided by rule of 
law to minority shareholders; CREDITOR RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of rights granted to creditors in a country; and GOVENMENT 
SPENDING is the ratio of government expenditure to gross domestic product. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
confidence. 
 
  
Variable Unit N Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean if SI=0 Mean if SI=1
Dependent
STATE INTERVENTION (SI) Binary 633 0.066 0.249 0.000 1.000
Independent
Bank fundamentals
EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS % 633 9.535 9.288 -16.200 91.400 9.828 5.412 2.996 ***
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS % 633 10.009 44.287 -850.000 250.000 9.579 16.064 -0.917
RETURN ON ASSETS % 633 0.854 1.268 -8.500 12.000 0.872 0.612 1.283
INTERBANK RATIO % 633 143.457 195.570 0.000 999.000 148.793 68.369 2.587 ***
BANK SIZE Number 633 14.984 2.281 8.700 21.400 14.749 18.288 -10.524 ***
Country characteristics
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS Multinomial 633 6.316 1.761 3.000 9.000 6.342 5.952 1.386
CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX Multinomial 633 6.102 1.891 3.000 10.000 6.110 5.995 0.379
INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION Multinomial 633 1.964 0.671 1.000 3.000 1.956 2.071 -1.078
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS Multinomial 633 3.197 1.009 2.000 5.000 3.200 3.167 0.205
CREDITOR RIGHTS Multinomial 633 2.087 1.187 0.000 4.000 2.108 1.786 1.705 *
GOVERNMENT SPENDING % 633 45.118 4.725 35.900 52.200 45.079 45.674 -0.788
T-statistic
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Table 4. Pairwise correlations of variables 
STATE INTERVENTION is a binary variable where 1 indicates that the bank received state intervention during the 2008-09 financial crisis and 0 
otherwise. EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS is the ratio of equity to total assets; LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS is the ratio of loan loss provisions to net 
interest revenue; RETURN ON ASSETS is the ratio of earnings to average assets; INTERBANK RATIO is the ratio of loans extended to the interbank 
market to loans received from the interbank market; and BANK SIZE is the logarithm of the total assets of the banks. REGULATORY 
RESTRICTIONS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX and INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION are composite indexes that measure the overall 
restrictions on banking activities, the stringency of capital requirements and the degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from the 
government and legally protected from the banking industry. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of rights provided by rule of 
law to minority shareholders; CREDITOR RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of rights granted to creditors in a country; and GOVENMENT 
SPENDING is the ratio of government expenditure to gross domestic product. * denotes significance at the 1% level confidence (2-tailed). 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent
STATE INTERVENTION (SI) (1) 1.000
Independent
Bank fundamentals
EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS (2) -0.1184* 1.000
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS (3) 0.037 -0.008 1.000
RETURN ON ASSETS (4) -0.051 0.2838* -0.079 1.000
INTERBANK RATIO (5) -0.1024* 0.006 -0.016 -0.015 1.000
BANK SIZE (6) 0.3864* -0.4903* 0.024 -0.071 -0.1205* 1.000
Country characteristics
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS (7) -0.055 -0.069 0.006 0.006 0.003 -0.030 1.000
CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX (8) -0.015 0.023 0.056 -0.1109* 0.052 -0.016 -0.1581* 1.000
INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION (9) 0.043 -0.047 -0.013 0.006 -0.093 0.041 0.011 -0.002 1.000
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS (10) -0.008 0.044 -0.005 -0.015 -0.033 0.086 -0.6358* 0.2741* -0.032 1.000
CREDITOR RIGHTS (11) -0.068 0.091 0.000 -0.005 -0.011 -0.038 -0.5781* -0.1668* 0.072 0.3192* 1.000
GOVERNMENT SPENDING (12) 0.031 0.033 -0.021 0.021 -0.090 -0.1267* 0.3469* -0.029 0.2269* -0.1533* -0.4710* 1.000
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Table 5.1. (Baseline model of) State interventions as a function of bank fundamentals and country characteristics with the clog-log 
STATE INTERVENTION is a binary variable where 1 indicates that the bank received state intervention during the 2008-09 financial crisis and 0 
otherwise. EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS is the ratio of equity to total assets; LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS is the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
net interest revenue; RETURN ON ASSETS is the ratio of earnings to average assets; INTERBANK RATIO is the ratio of loans extended to the 
interbank market to loans received from the interbank market; and BANK SIZE is the logarithm of the total assets of the banks. REGULATORY 
RESTRICTIONS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX and INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION are composite indexes that measure, 
respectively, the overall restrictions on banking activities, the stringency of capital requirements and the degree to which the supervisory authority 
is independent from the government and legally protected from the banking industry. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of 
rights provided by rule of law to minority shareholders; CREDITOR RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of rights granted to creditors in a 
country; and GOVENMENT SPENDING is the ratio of government expenditure to gross domestic product. Robust standard errors are presented in 
brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels confidence. 
 
  
Dependent                                                                       
STATE INTERVENTION
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Independent
Bank fundamentals
EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS 0.017 1.017 0.017 1.017 0.016 1.017 0.018 1.018 0.017 1.017
(0.618) (0.584) (0.522) (0.704) (0.561)
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS 0.009 1.009 0.009 1.009 0.010 1.010 0.008 1.008 0.009 1.009
(1.066) (1.060) (1.212) (1.026) (1.113)
RETURN ON ASSETS -0.183 0.832 -0.181 0.835 -0.197 0.821 -0.180 0.835 -0.190 0.827
(-0.438) (-0.438) (-0.458) (-0.438) (-0.463)
INTERBANK RATIO -0.004 0.996 * -0.004 0.996 * -0.004 0.996 * -0.004 0.996 * -0.004 0.996 *
(-1.923) (-1.904) (-1.918) (-1.860) (-1.838)
BANK SIZE 0.601 1.825 *** 0.615 1.849 *** 0.613 1.845 *** 0.601 1.823 *** 0.619 1.858 ***
(7.439) (8.023) (7.704) (7.285) (7.977)
Country characteristics
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS 0.051 1.052 0.038 1.039
(0.454) (0.236)
CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX -0.104 0.901 -0.091 0.913
(-0.735) (-0.552)
INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION 0.104 1.109 0.126 1.134
(0.244) (0.248)
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
CREDITOR RIGHTS
GOVERNMENT SPENDING
Log-likelihood -87.378 -86.802 -87.337 -87.320 -86.548
Likelihood ratio test (i) vs (A) 0.370 1.370 0.210 1.700
Wald chi^2 79.442 *** 93.588 *** 91.014 *** 81.427 *** 97.935 ***
Banks 633 633 633 633 633
State Interventions 42 42 42 42 42
PANEL EPANEL A PANEL B PANEL C PANEL D
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Table 5.2. (Baseline model of) State interventions as a function of bank fundamentals and country characteristics with the clog-log 
STATE INTERVENTION is a binary variable where 1 indicates that the bank received state intervention during the 2008-09 financial crisis and 0 
otherwise. EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS is the ratio of equity to total assets; LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS is the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
net interest revenue; RETURN ON ASSETS is the ratio of earnings to average assets; INTERBANK RATIO is the ratio of loans extended to the 
interbank market to loans received from the interbank market; and BANK SIZE is the logarithm of the total assets of the banks. REGULATORY 
RESTRICTIONS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX and INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION are composite indexes that measure, 
respectively, the overall restrictions on banking activities, the stringency of capital requirements and the degree to which the supervisory authority 
is independent from the government and legally protected from the banking industry. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of 
rights provided by rule of law to minority shareholders; CREDITOR RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of rights granted to creditors in a 
country; and GOVENMENT SPENDING is the ratio of government expenditure to gross domestic product. Robust standard errors are presented in 
brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels confidence. 
 
  
Dependent                                                                       
STATE INTERVENTION
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Independent
Bank fundamentals
EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS 0.017 1.017 0.017 1.017 0.013 1.013 0.019 1.019 0.028 1.029
(0.553) (0.633) (0.433) (0.682) (1.143)
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS 0.009 1.009 0.012 1.012 0.010 1.010 0.012 1.012 0.009 1.009
(1.067) (1.363) (1.180) (1.287) (1.101)
RETURN ON ASSETS -0.181 0.834 -0.149 0.862 -0.123 0.884 -0.166 0.847 -0.230 0.795
(-0.445) (-0.366) (-0.265) (-0.432) (-0.706)
INTERBANK RATIO -0.004 0.996 * -0.005 0.995 ** -0.004 0.996 * -0.005 0.995 * -0.005 0.995 **
(-1.835) (-1.969) (-1.760) (-1.900) (-2.016)
BANK SIZE 0.640 1.896 *** 0.647 1.910 *** 0.614 1.849 *** 0.675 1.963 *** 0.693 2.000 ***
(8.711) (8.313) (7.560) (8.028) (6.737)
Country characteristics
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS -0.578 0.561 ***
(-2.659)
CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX -0.074 0.928
(-0.874)
INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION 0.552 1.737
(1.342)
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS -0.310 0.733 -0.241 0.786 -0.754 0.470 ***
(-1.384) (-0.996) (-3.126)
CREDITOR RIGHTS -0.359 0.699 ** -0.363 0.696 -0.874 0.417 ***
(-2.569) (-1.540) (-3.885)
GOVERNMENT SPENDING 0.061 1.063 -0.014 0.986 -0.028 0.972
(1.479) (-0.266) (-0.534)
Log-likelihood -86.377 -85.316 -86.986 -84.574 -69.743
Likelihood ratio test (i) vs (A) 4.440 ** 8.050 *** 3.070 * 10.300 ** 25.440 ***
Wald chi^2 136.650 *** 164.400 *** 146.700 *** 149.870 *** 342.670 ***
Banks 633 633 633 633 633
State Interventions 42 42 42 42 42
PANEL F PANEL G PANEL H PANEL I PANEL J
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Table 6. State interventions restricted to recapitalizations as a function of bank fundamentals and country characteristics with the clog-log 
STATE INTERVENTION is a binary variable where 1 indicates that the bank received state intervention in the form of recapitalization during the 
2008-09 financial crisis and 0 otherwise. EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS is the ratio of equity to total assets; LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS is the 
ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest revenue; RETURN ON ASSETS is the ratio of earnings to average assets; INTERBANK RATIO is the 
ratio of loans extended to the interbank market to loans received from the interbank market; and BANK SIZE is the logarithm of the total assets of 
the banks. REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX and INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION are composite 
indexes that measure, respectively, the overall restrictions on banking activities, the stringency of capital requirements and the degree to which the 
supervisory authority is independent from the government and legally protected from the banking industry. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS is an 
indicator of the strength of rights provided by rule of law to minority shareholders; CREDITOR RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of rights 
granted to creditors in a country; and GOVENMENT SPENDING is the ratio of government expenditure to gross domestic product. Robust standard 
errors are presented in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels confidence. 
 
  
(Restricted) Dependent                                                                       
STATE INTERVENTION (RECAPITALIZATION)
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Independent
Bank fundamentals
EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS 0.051 1.052 *** 0.059 1.061 *** 0.051 1.052 *** 0.057 1.058 ***
(3.751) (4.157) (3.718) (3.948)
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS 0.011 1.011 0.008 1.008 0.013 1.013 0.008 1.008
(0.925) (0.564) (1.131) (0.676)
RETURN ON ASSETS -0.372 0.689 -0.317 0.729 -0.284 0.753 -0.297 0.743
(-0.677) (-0.852) (-0.388) (-0.665)
INTERBANK RATIO -0.004 0.996 -0.004 0.996 -0.003 0.997 -0.004 0.996
(-1.415) (-1.297) (-1.361) (-1.267)
BANK SIZE 0.732 2.079 *** 0.779 2.180 *** 0.755 2.128 *** 0.774 2.167 ***
(4.832) (4.015) (4.194) (4.208)
Country characteristics
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS 0.167 1.182 -0.211 0.810
(1.252) (-0.860)
CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX 0.123 1.131 0.102 1.107
(1.031) (0.712)
INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION 0.756 2.130 * 0.731 2.078
(1.814) (1.485)
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS -0.022 0.978 -0.433 0.648
(-0.095) (-1.227)
CREDITOR RIGHTS 0.166 1.181 -0.076 0.927
(0.987) (-0.200)
GOVERNMENT SPENDING 0.135 1.145 * 0.108 1.114
(1.898) (1.260)
Log-likelihood -44.413 -42.803 -44.152 -36.146
Wald chi^2 113.360 *** 167.180 *** 140.490 *** 1017.200 ***
Banks 606 606 606 606
State Interventions 18 18 18 18
PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C PANEL D
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Table 7. State interventions as a function of (alternative measures of) bank fundamentals and country characteristics with the clog-log 
STATE INTERVENTION is a binary variable where 1 indicates that the bank received state intervention during the 2008-09 financial crisis and 0 
otherwise. EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS is the ratio of equity to total assets; LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS is the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
net interest revenue; RETURN ON ASSETS is the ratio of earnings to average assets; INTERBANK RATIO is the ratio of loans extended to the 
interbank market to loans received from the interbank market; and BANK SIZE is the logarithm of the total assets of the banks. TOTAL CAPITAL 
RATIO is the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets; IMPAIRED TO TOTAL LOANS is the ratio of impaired loans to total loans; 
RETURN ON ASSETS is the ratio of earnings to average assets; and RETURN ON EQUITY is the ratio of earnings to book value of equity. 
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX and INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION are composite indexes that 
measure, respectively, the overall restrictions on banking activities, the stringency of capital requirements and the degree to which the supervisory 
authority is independent from the government and legally protected from the banking industry. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS is an indicator of the 
strength of rights provided by rule of law to minority shareholders; CREDITOR RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of rights granted to creditors 
in a country; and GOVENMENT SPENDING is the ratio of government expenditure to gross domestic product. Robust standard errors are presented 
in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels confidence. 
 
  
Dependent                                                                                 
STATE INTERVENTION
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Independent
Bank fundamentals
EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS 0.029 1.030 0.015 1.015 0.024 1.025
(1.202) (0.423) (0.809)
TOTAL CAPITAL RATIO -0.070 0.933 -0.177 0.838
(-0.941) (-1.546)
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS -0.002 0.998 0.011 1.012 0.006 1.006
(-0.137) (1.235) (0.662)
IMPAIRED TO TOTAL LOANS -0.026 0.974 -0.227 0.797 ***
(-0.297) (-2.841)
RETURN ON ASSETS 0.270 1.310 -0.412 0.662 -0.344 0.709
(1.273) (-1.197) (-1.062)
RETURN ON EQUITY 0.013 1.013 -0.006 0.994
(0.604) (-0.274)
INTERBANK RATIO -0.005 0.995 -0.006 0.995 ** -0.005 0.995 **
(-1.458) (-2.204) (-1.980)
LIQUID ASSETS TO DEPOSITS & SHORT TERM FUNDING -0.014 0.986 ** -0.015 0.985
(-2.168) (-1.394)
BANK SIZE 0.628 1.873 *** 0.583 1.791 *** 0.668 1.949 *** 0.814 2.257 *** 0.718 2.051 ***
(4.835) (5.000) (6.200) (6.957) (2.970)
Country characteristics
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS -0.669 0.512 *** -0.827 0.437 *** -0.561 0.570 ** -0.606 0.546 *** -0.961 0.382 ***
(-3.566) (-5.508) (-2.569) (-2.933) (-5.344)
CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX 0.035 1.035 0.071 1.073 -0.067 0.935 -0.035 0.966 0.095 1.100
(0.295) (0.769) (-0.750) (-0.377) (0.877)
INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION 0.249 1.282 0.686 1.985 * 0.529 1.697 0.608 1.838 0.405 1.500
(0.686) (1.737) (1.300) (1.519) (1.072)
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS -0.908 0.403 *** -1.240 0.289 *** -0.697 0.498 *** -0.795 0.452 *** -1.491 0.225 ***
(-3.059) (-6.814) (-2.923) (-3.068) (-7.089)
CREDITOR RIGHTS -0.844 0.430 *** -1.095 0.335 *** -0.840 0.432 *** -0.914 0.401 *** -1.210 0.298 ***
(-3.072) (-7.779) (-3.814) (-3.630) (-6.344)
GOVERNMENT SPENDING -0.024 0.976 -0.099 0.906 * -0.010 0.990 -0.023 0.977 -0.060 0.942
(-0.376) (-1.725) (-0.214) (-0.439) (-1.225)
Log-likelihood -53.391 -69.730 -70.017 -66.587 -46.691
Wald chi^2 750.000 *** 355.160 *** 234.020 *** 731.210 *** 170.300 ***
Banks 314 293 633 632 223
State Interventions 35 40 42 42 34
PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C PANEL D PANEL E
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Table 8. State interventions as a function of (lagged) bank fundamentals and country characteristics with the clog-log 
STATE INTERVENTION is a binary variable where 1 indicates that the bank received state intervention during the 2008-09 financial crisis and 0 
otherwise. EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS is the ratio of equity to total assets; LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS is the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
net interest revenue; RETURN ON ASSETS is the ratio of earnings to average assets; INTERBANK RATIO is the ratio of loans extended to the 
interbank market to loans received from the interbank market; and BANK SIZE is the logarithm of the total assets of the banks. REGULATORY 
RESTRICTIONS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX and INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION are composite indexes that measure, 
respectively, the overall restrictions on banking activities, the stringency of capital requirements and the degree to which the supervisory authority 
is independent from the government and legally protected from the banking industry. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of 
rights provided by rule of law to minority shareholders; CREDITOR RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of rights granted to creditors in a 
country; and GOVENMENT SPENDING is the ratio of government expenditure to gross domestic product. Robust standard errors are presented in 
brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels confidence. 
 
  
Dependent                                                                       
STATE INTERVENTION
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Independent
Bank fundamentals
EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS 0.008 1.008 0.010 1.010 0.013 1.013 0.025 1.025
(0.454) (0.650) (0.599) (1.206)
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS -0.002 0.998 -0.002 0.998 -0.001 0.999 -0.001 0.999
(-0.423) (-0.309) (-0.119) (-0.228)
RETURN ON ASSETS 0.323 1.381 *** 0.315 1.371 *** 0.328 1.388 *** 0.261 1.299 **
(4.249) (3.894) (3.606) (2.539)
INTERBANK RATIO -0.004 0.996 ** -0.004 0.996 ** -0.004 0.996 *** -0.005 0.995 ***
(-2.361) (-2.188) (-2.577) (-2.668)
BANK SIZE 0.643 1.901 *** 0.664 1.943 *** 0.718 2.050 *** 0.752 2.121 ***
(7.519) (7.579) (7.344) (6.177)
Country characteristics
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS 0.050 1.052 -0.592 0.553 **
(0.352) (-2.551)
CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX -0.042 0.959 0.015 1.015
(-0.281) (0.166)
INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION 0.251 1.286 0.680 1.974 *
(0.531) (1.744)
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS -0.299 0.741 -0.868 0.420 ***
(-1.171) (-2.797)
CREDITOR RIGHTS -0.372 0.690 * -0.890 0.411 ***
(-1.723) (-3.923)
GOVERNMENT SPENDING -0.042 0.959 -0.059 0.942
(-0.950) (-1.329)
Log-likelihood -44.413 -42.803 -44.152 -36.146
Wald chi^2 113.360 *** 167.180 *** 140.490 *** 1017.200 ***
Banks 553 553 553 553
State Interventions 41 41 41 41
PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C PANEL D
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Table 9. State interventions as a function of bank fundamentals and country characteristics with the clog-log matched with propensity scores 
STATE INTERVENTION is a binary variable where 1 indicates that the bank received state intervention during the 2008-09 financial crisis and 0 
otherwise. EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS is the ratio of equity to total assets; LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS is the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
net interest revenue; RETURN ON ASSETS is the ratio of earnings to average assets; INTERBANK RATIO is the ratio of loans extended to the 
interbank market to loans received from the interbank market; and BANK SIZE is the logarithm of the total assets of the banks. REGULATORY 
RESTRICTIONS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX and INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION are composite indexes that measure, 
respectively, the overall restrictions on banking activities, the stringency of capital requirements and the degree to which the supervisory authority 
is independent from the government and legally protected from the banking industry. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of 
rights provided by rule of law to minority shareholders; CREDITOR RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of rights granted to creditors in a 
country; and GOVENMENT SPENDING is the ratio of government expenditure to gross domestic product. Robust standard errors are presented in 
brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels confidence. 
 
  
Dependent                                                                       
STATE INTERVENTION
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Independent
Bank fundamentals
EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS 0.024 1.024 0.025 1.025 0.028 1.029 0.035 1.036
(0.037) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS 0.011 1.011 0.012 1.012 0.013 1.013 0.012 1.012
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
RETURN ON ASSETS -0.193 0.824 -0.211 0.809 -0.204 0.815 -0.302 0.740
(0.257) (0.261) (0.253) (0.249)
INTERBANK RATIO -0.005 0.995 * -0.005 0.995 * -0.005 0.995 * -0.006 0.994 *
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
BANK SIZE 0.719 2.053 *** 0.730 2.075 *** 0.799 2.224 *** 0.823 2.277 ***
(0.098) (0.102) (0.110) (0.117)
Country characteristics
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS 0.023 1.023 -0.682 0.505 ***
(0.102) (0.218)
CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX -0.098 0.906 -0.060 0.942
(0.101) (0.110)
INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION 0.142 1.152 0.632 1.881 *
(0.298) (0.366)
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS -0.297 0.743 -0.940 0.391 ***
(0.191) (0.296)
CREDITOR RIGHTS -0.343 0.709 * -0.913 0.401 ***
(0.193) (0.268)
GOVERNMENT SPENDING -0.011 0.989 -0.024 0.977
(0.047) (0.049)
Log-likelihood -65.997 -63.418 -64.492 -51.181
Wald chi^2 99.960 *** 101.260 *** 108.400 *** 123.070 ***
Pseudo R
2 0.324 0.328 0.351 0.398
Banks 633 633 633 633
State Interventions 42 42 42 42
PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C PANEL D
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Table 10. State interventions as a function of bank fundamentals and country characteristics with the clog-log split by the median size 
STATE INTERVENTION is a binary variable where 1 indicates that the bank received state intervention during the 2008-09 financial crisis and 0 
otherwise. EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS is the ratio of equity to total assets; LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS is the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
net interest revenue; RETURN ON ASSETS is the ratio of earnings to average assets; INTERBANK RATIO is the ratio of loans extended to the 
interbank market to loans received from the interbank market; and BANK SIZE is the logarithm of the total assets of the banks. REGULATORY 
RESTRICTIONS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX and INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION are composite indexes that measure, 
respectively, the overall restrictions on banking activities, the stringency of capital requirements and the degree to which the supervisory authority 
is independent from the government and legally protected from the banking industry. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of 
rights provided by rule of law to minority shareholders; CREDITOR RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of rights granted to creditors in a 
country; and GOVENMENT SPENDING is the ratio of government expenditure to gross domestic product. Robust standard errors are presented in 
brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels confidence. 
 
  
Dependent                                                                       
STATE INTERVENTION
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Independent
Bank fundamentals
EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS 0.095 1.099 * -0.018 0.982
(1.805) (-0.287)
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS 0.001 1.001 0.013 1.013
(0.032) (1.340)
RETURN ON ASSETS -3.483 0.031 0.092 1.097
(-1.279) (0.283)
INTERBANK RATIO -0.004 0.996 -0.006 0.994 *
(-1.374) (-1.651)
BANK SIZE 5.206 182.334 0.693 2.000 ***
(1.192) (4.906)
Country characteristics
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS -0.409 0.664 -0.638 0.528 ***
(-1.455) (-3.394)
CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX -1.495 0.224 -0.041 0.960
(-1.634) (-0.542)
INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION -2.901 0.055 0.706 2.027 *
(-1.014) (1.674)
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 1.972 7.187 * -0.881 0.414 ***
(1.825) (-4.863)
CREDITOR RIGHTS -0.389 0.678 -1.043 0.352 ***
(-0.437) (-5.190)
GOVERNMENT SPENDING 0.438 1.550 * -0.041 0.960
(1.887) (-0.737)
Log-likelihood -44.152 -76.000
Wald chi^2 140.490 *** 160.000 ***
Banks 323 310
State Interventions 3 39
PANEL A (<Median) PANEL B (>=Median)
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Table 11. State interventions as a function of bank fundamentals and country characteristics with the clog-log split by non-GIIPS and GIIPS 
STATE INTERVENTION is a binary variable where 1 indicates that the bank received state intervention during the 2008-09 financial crisis and 0 
otherwise. EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS is the ratio of equity to total assets; LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS is the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
net interest revenue; RETURN ON ASSETS is the ratio of earnings to average assets; INTERBANK RATIO is the ratio of loans extended to the 
interbank market to loans received from the interbank market; and BANK SIZE is the logarithm of the total assets of the banks. REGULATORY 
RESTRICTIONS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX and INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION are composite indexes that measure, 
respectively, the overall restrictions on banking activities, the stringency of capital requirements and the degree to which the supervisory authority 
is independent from the government and legally protected from the banking industry. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of 
rights provided by rule of law to minority shareholders; CREDITOR RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of rights granted to creditors in a 
country; and GOVENMENT SPENDING is the ratio of government expenditure to gross domestic product. GIIPS is the abbreviation for Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The odds ratio of INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION in Panel B is divided by 1000. Robust standard errors 
are presented in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels confidence. 
 
  
Dependent                                                                       
STATE INTERVENTION
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Independent
Bank fundamentals
EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS 0.029 1.029 *** 0.113 1.120
(2.881) (0.767)
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS 0.003 1.003 0.054 1.056 **
(0.390) (2.502)
RETURN ON ASSETS -0.289 0.749 -0.051 0.951
(-0.968) (-0.074)
INTERBANK RATIO -0.008 0.992 ** -0.003 0.997
(-2.309) (-0.597)
BANK SIZE 0.643 1.903 *** 1.473 4.361 ***
(5.673) (4.343)
Country characteristics
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS -0.511 0.600 * -6.132 0.002 ***
(-1.956) (-7.292)
CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX 0.070 1.073 -1.103 0.332 ***
(0.610) (-7.241)
INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION 0.373 1.452 * 13.817 1,002 ***
(1.743) (10.342)
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS -0.679 0.507 ** -7.478 0.001 ***
(-2.453) (-9.295)
CREDITOR RIGHTS -0.319 0.727
(-1.218)
GOVERNMENT SPENDING 0.081 1.085 *
(1.716)
Log-likelihood -44.152 -15.000
Wald chi^2 140.490 ***
Banks 492 141
State Interventions 28 14
PANEL A (Non-GIIPS) PANEL B (GIIPS)
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Table 12. (Baseline model of) State interventions as a function of bank fundamentals and country characteristics with the standard logit 
STATE INTERVENTION is a binary variable where 1 indicates that the bank received state intervention during the 2008-09 financial crisis and 0 
otherwise. EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS is the ratio of equity to total assets; LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS is the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
net interest revenue; RETURN ON ASSETS is the ratio of earnings to average assets; INTERBANK RATIO is the ratio of loans extended to the 
interbank market to loans received from the interbank market; and BANK SIZE is the logarithm of the total assets of the banks. REGULATORY 
RESTRICTIONS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX and INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION are composite indexes that measure, 
respectively, the overall restrictions on banking activities, the stringency of capital requirements and the degree to which the supervisory authority 
is independent from the government and legally protected from the banking industry. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of 
rights provided by rule of law to minority shareholders; CREDITOR RIGHTS is an indicator of the strength of rights granted to creditors in a 
country; and GOVENMENT SPENDING is the ratio of government expenditure to gross domestic product. Robust standard errors are presented in 
brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels confidence. 
 
 
Dependent                                                                       
STATE INTERVENTION
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Coef.
(Std Error)
Odds ratio Sig.
Independent
Bank fundamentals
EQUITY TO TOTAL ASSETS 0.024 1.024 0.025 1.025 0.028 1.029 0.035 1.036
(0.918) (0.954) (1.059) (1.397)
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS 0.011 1.011 0.012 1.012 0.013 1.013 0.012 1.012
(1.102) (1.154) (1.109) (1.018)
RETURN ON ASSETS -0.193 0.824 -0.211 0.809 -0.204 0.815 -0.302 0.740
(-0.428) (-0.485) (-0.505) (-0.878)
INTERBANK RATIO -0.005 0.995 * -0.005 0.995 * -0.005 0.995 * -0.006 0.994 **
(-1.829) (-1.784) (-1.879) (-2.029)
BANK SIZE 0.719 2.053 *** 0.730 2.075 *** 0.799 2.224 *** 0.823 2.277 ***
(5.919) (6.327) (6.171) (5.749)
Country characteristics
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS 0.023 1.023 -0.682 0.505 ***
(0.137) (-2.813)
CAPITAL REQUIREMENT INDEX -0.098 0.906 -0.060 0.942
(-0.641) (-0.580)
INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION 0.142 1.152 0.632 1.881
(0.238) (1.538)
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS -0.297 0.743 -0.940 0.391 ***
(-1.031) (-2.656)
CREDITOR RIGHTS -0.343 0.709 -0.913 0.401 ***
(-1.350) (-3.219)
GOVERNMENT SPENDING -0.011 0.989 -0.024 0.977
(-0.209) (-0.401)
Log-likelihood -44.413 -42.803 -44.152 -36.146
Wald chi^2 113.360 *** 167.180 *** 140.490 *** 1017.200 ***
Banks 633 633 633 633
State Interventions 42 42 42 42
PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C PANEL D
